

INTEGRATING TURKISH COMMUNITIES: A GERMAN DILEMMA

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INTRODUCTION

Germany has a long tradition of relying on foreign labor, commencing with Polish farm hands working on East Prussian estates in the late 19th century.¹ The German coal and steel industry could not have been built early in the last century had workers who had migrated from Poland and Italy decided not to stay in Germany. Between 1910 and 1920 there were about 1.2 million immigrant workers in Germany and they constituted about two percent of the population. The expansion of the Third Reich and the occupation and exploitation of most of Europe was made possible by a large foreign labor force reaching in August 1944, about one third of the German labor force.² After World War II, the economic reliance on foreign labor continued into the 1950s prior to Turkey becoming a source of cheap labor, Italy provided manpower to fuel the German economic miracle, the *Wirtschaftswunder*. As distinct from the neutral term ‘immigrants’ applied to workers coming to the United States, the terms used by Germans are loaded and clearly denote migrant workers as outsiders. Initially called *Fremdarbeiter*, or foreign/alien workers, they were later labeled *Gastarbeiter* or guest workers, denoting in the German meaning of the term, their alien or temporary status.

The issue of viewing Turkish immigrants as outsiders signals an exceedingly volatile topic in Germany. At the core of this topic is a concern with German national identity and how to deal with all foreigners, not just Turkish immigrants. A number of policy strategies have been attempted, including integrating the Turkish population into mainstream German society, and limiting the number of immigrants entering Germany.

Integration itself is an interesting concept from German perspective. Essentially, it means turning Turks into Germans. Pluralism or multiculturalism has no say in the matter. The purpose of this paper is to raise and discuss several important topics concerning the current German view of integrating the Turkish community.

Work, Citizenship and Ethnicity

The 'Recruitment Agreement for Labor' of 1961 assured a steady supply of Turkish male laborers which had risen to close to one million of the 2.6 million foreign workers by 1973 when Germany entered a recession and stopped importing immigrant labor. Contrary to the expectation that migrant workers would return to Turkey, most decided to remain in Germany. All policies adopted by the German government, including cash bonuses, failed to induce their return to Turkey. Their failure to come home was not opposed by the Turkish government since it alleviated high unemployment in Turkey, and provided Turkey with a steady source of hard currency. As many Turks working in Germany sent money home to their families.

Life in urban Germany appeared more comfortable than the rural Anatolian countryside from which most migrant workers came. During the second phase of the growth of the Turkish community in Germany, which lasted until the early 1980s, family unification prevailed, resulting in a sizable influx of spouses and children. The third and current phase denotes German-born members of Turkish families. This includes spouses imported by young Turks from mainly rural areas since Turkish women from local German communities are considered to be too Western³. Furthermore, there is the politically motivated migration of Kurds from Turkey to Germany and some illegal economic migration as well. To date, there are more Turks coming to Germany than are leaving. In 2002, seventeen percent of German Turks were born in Germany; fifty three percent came to Germany in the context of family unification, and only thirty percent came to Germany as migrant workers⁴. In late 2002, there were about 2.5 million Turks in Germany, by far the largest and best established foreign group in Germany. The present Turkish community in Germany includes first, second and third generation German residents of Turkish origin of whom an estimated 500.000 hold a German passport⁵. In major Metropolitan areas, such as Frankfurt, the share of foreign-born individuals is 28 percent of the residential population, with cities such as Berlin, Cologne, Munich, and Stuttgart. The metropolitan belt of the Ruhr region also shows a high proportion of foreigners among the resident population.

If Muslims from other nationalities are added, a total of 3.1 million Muslims live among the residents of Germany, thus the country has, after France, the largest concentration of Muslims outside their countries of origin. In late 2002 the percentage of foreigners in Germany amounted to about nine percent of the total population and was the second highest in the European Union after Austria⁶. This persistence of a large group of foreigners continues

despite their having an unemployment rate of 14.9 percent, which is twice as high than the 8.8 rate experienced by ethnic German workers ⁷.

As of January 2000, the legal basis for citizenship has been modified. Under the old law, *ius sanguinis*, citizenship was determined by biological origin. Before the change about 100,000 children born each year in Germany to foreign parents could not become German. The new but restrictive regulations bestow citizenship without proof of German ancestry by the applicant, though under cumbersome and bureaucratic rules. Thus children whose parents are foreigners acquire automatic temporary German citizenship if born in Germany, provided that at least one parent has lived legally in Germany for eight years and has held the residential permit for unlimited stay for at least three years. They also acquire the citizenship of their parents and must decide at age of 23, which citizenship they prefer to hold. Like Austria, Germany does not permit dual citizenship. A Turk who becomes a naturalized German citizen must give up his Turkish passport. Apart from not experiencing 'being German' this is one of the principal reasons why relatively few Turks start the process of becoming a German citizen. This reluctance was reinforced, until 1996, by Turkish regulations depriving individuals of property rights if they abandon their Turkish citizenship. Under Turkish law foreigners can acquire but are not allowed to inherit property. Turks who become Germans solved the problems by applying for "pink cards" from Turkish authorities to preserve their rights to inherit, but these cards were not automatically issued. Further, there is fear among Turks living in Germany of having no place to live if conditions in Germany deteriorate. Thus by early 2002 only about 470,000 Turkish migrants held a German passport ⁸. A loophole in this system was closed in 1997. Before that year, Turks desiring a German passport would officially abandon their Turkish citizenship, become German citizens and then reapply and receive their Turkish citizenship again. In effect this meant having a dual citizenship. The Kohl government put an end to that practice.

The official German governmental position on dual citizenship maintains that the goal of politics is not to create dual citizenships, a view shared by the conservative opposition. Yet German-Turks are affected by it and deplore the loss of their Turkish citizenship, which results from the new regulations. As the President of the Federation of Turkish Communities in Germany, Hakki Keskin suggested--the first and second generation Turks living in Germany will not give up their Turkish citizenship since it is part of their identity and the surrender of this identity cannot be legislated. Dual citizenship continues therefore to be a central demand of the Turkish community ⁹.

A second major point of friction is the religious factor. Though German basic law assures the right of all children to publicly sponsored religious education, such education is only provided to Catholic and Protestant and, as of late, to some Jewish pupils. In 1987, the Islamic Federation of Berlin applied for permission to provide religious instruction in some public schools. It took more than twenty years to move the claim through the German legal system until the highest administrative court decided in favor of the Federation. Today in spite of this decision, there are only a few German public schools in Berlin offering religious education to Muslim students. Throughout Germany, virtually every Muslim student receives such training outside the school setting. Similar unequal treatment can be observed in other ethnic areas. German agencies do not provide financial support to the numerous self-help organizations, social service agencies, and other nonprofit groups operated by and for Turkish migrants. Since the Muslim faith has no legal status in Germany compared to other major denominations for which the state collects church taxes, Muslim religious communities are not entitled to such service or public subsidies. The Suessmuth Commission suggested that “the introduction of regular Islamic courses in German represents an important step toward equal treatment compared to the already established religious communities in the area of schools offering general education.... the Islamic religious courses play an important role in sustaining the identities of Muslim children and young people growing up here.”¹⁰ Needless to say, religious instruction in German schools serves the goal of integration better than instruction in the Turkish language in private Koran schools. Such schools escape state supervision and their instruction would not be understood anyhow since very few German teachers have a working command of the Turkish language. This is also tied to the fact that Koran schools, as Islamic organizations, are not recognized under corporate law.

The failure of legally acknowledging the Muslim faith is in part caused by the fragmented nature of the Muslim communities in Germany. There seems to be no internal common denominator among the 2,400 mosques in Germany. They represent many different religious orientations of the Sunni and Allevite branches of Islam. More significant, however, is the widely held view that the Muslim faith cannot be reconciled with Western traditions, that public support for Muslim institutions would foster separatist tendencies and possibly fundamentalism. Ironically, the opposite may apply. Once recognized as a legitimate religious faith, fiscal support for mosque affiliated Turkish communities and self-help organizations can set in. Such fiscal support could in turn serve to support the peaceful economic integration of Turkish migrants and their descendent into German society and remove the ‘foreign’ stigma from their faith.

As in France and the United Kingdom, where more Muslims attend services in the mosques than British citizens do in the High Church of England, there is a gradual process of Islamization taking place among the 3.2 million Muslims living in Germany today. For young Turks who joined their families during the second phase, the period of family unification, the Muslim faith can compensate for the declining attachment to the Turkish state and relatively weak link to Germany and help shape a sense of identity and meet the desire for a sense of community among German-Turks. The third generation, young Turks who were born in Germany and are better educated than the other generations, perceives and experiences more acutely discrimination, and the status of being outsiders. They can achieve a sense of belonging to a community by joining a local mosque. This possibility is enhanced by the '*umma*' , (the community of Muslims) principle, unknown in other denominations: a Muslim can join any mosque and benefit from the services it provides.

Lastly, age plays a role since the longer the German-Turk lives in Germany, the more likely it is that he embraces religion.¹¹ It should also be noted that the German Turks consider religion much more frequently as an important factor in their lives than do native Germans from the same age group.

Certainly the number of fundamentalists totally rejecting integration into Western societies is very low. Most German-Turks aspire to economic integration and access to employment, housing and other social service. A desire quest for cultural and social integration is the least of their concerns. As Cem Ozdemir a former member of the German parliament views it, as long as Muslims respect the German constitution, speak a bit of the language and accept the values of society, which are universal and not specifically Christian, their readiness to fit in should not be questioned.¹² Cultural and social integration have become relevant for upscale Turkish migrants, but it is of secondary importance for most Turks with low incomes and for those who are part of the underclass in Germany. Listening to Mozart and reading Schiller would appear strange to the more than forty percent of the adult male Turkish population in Berlin who are unemployed. The same holds for the German lower class, though conservative politicians never suggested that it adopt the German *Leitkultur*. Culture cannot be a top down proposition and attempts to do so will fail, as the French experience with Andre Malraux's *maison de la culture* showed.

The ethnic networks within which most Turks in Germany are embedded play a significant role. They are constituted by a frequently well functioning extended family, the ethnic neighborhood, community based

groups, self-help organizations, and the mosque. In the Ruhr valley of North Rhine Westphalia, a major industrial state with a declining industrial base and a large migrant minority group, more than one-in five hundred self help organizations serve the half million Turks living in the area.¹³ These networks serve to reinforce the 'foreign', that is to say Turkish identity, specifically for those who cannot and do not want to become 'integrated' into German institutions. The positive functions of this ethnic network are generally not covered by the German media.

Rather there is a media obsession with the Turkish family, depicted negatively with its 'traditional', 'repressive', and 'collectivistic' aspects which cannot be reconciled with the individualism associated with the fragmented German nuclear family. The frequently extended but much maligned Turkish family has more stability than the German family, if the large number of children, low divorce rates, and the solidity of marriage are the principal organizing elements used in making such judgments.

The stigma of being a Turkish migrant follows the low acceptance public opinion accords to German Turks and to those seeking asylum in Germany, whereas, individuals from member nations of the European Union do not face this kind of negative stigma. As Andreas Goldberg observes, through 1996 there has been a rise in the public approval of discrimination of non-EU foreigners German-Turks. Close to half of the German population would outlaw immigration and consider foreigners a burden on the German welfare system, forty percent believe that foreign workers cause unemployment for German workers, thirty percent would deport foreign workers in periods of recession and outlaw any political activity in which they are engaged, and twenty percent would make marriages between Germans and Turks illegal.¹⁴ Compared to other ethnic immigrant groups, such as Greek, Italian, Yugoslav, and East European nationals, Turks fare worst in terms of negative evaluations and attributions.

In light of economic deprivation and discrimination, it is not surprising that Turkish immigrants in Germany and members of their families assert their identities both as Turks and as Muslims. They also express their attraction to the services provided by multiple Islamic organizations even if they were born in Germany. These Mosque-affiliated groups offer housing, employment, education and leisure services, which Turks have a difficult time accessing in the larger German community. That these organizations do not emphasize 'integration' comes as no surprise. After all, the average German cannot reconcile 'integration' because foreigners have the label of an *Auslaender*, and are also different in terms of appearance and lifestyles. Further, the largest agency providing services to Turkish immigrants is a Turkish governmental agency, the DITIB, the Turkish Islamic Union of the Institution for Religion.

It is part of the Turkish government's office for religious affairs and provides most of the Imams teaching the Koran in Islamic communities. As the Economist notes "...the DITIB does not do much for integration. On the contrary, since its main concern is the pursuit of Turkey's national interest, it encourages Turks in Germany to think of themselves as Turks."¹⁵

Ethnic Politics in Germany

To date, no major political party has openly played the ethnic hand in federal elections. As the last federal elections in Germany in 2002 showed, few substantive issues were articulated, such as economic growth, foreign policies, and the environment. Ethnic issues were kept in the background, though they are played out at the state and local level. Small right wing parties openly appeal to anti-foreigner sentiments and have lost about one million voters in the September 2002 Federal elections.

Even state level electoral results are contradictory. In North Rhine Westphalia, attempts to capitalize on perceived anti-Israeli sentiments by a senior political leader of the Liberals, the FDP, proved counter-productive. Also counter-productive was the conservative CDU Slogan *Kinder statt Inder* (children instead of Indians) used in a prior local campaign in this state. The slogan, slyly suggested that computer experts from India working in Germany may deprive German children from attaining such jobs. Yet the center-right Christian Democrats successfully mobilized political resentment against foreigners in 1999 in the state of Hessen, capitalizing on the widely shared view in Germany that there are already too many 'foreigners' living there.

Germany, like Austria, does not grant dual citizenship and makes obtaining German citizenship difficult. Attempts to change the citizenship policy by the current government were defeated by the Christian Democratic opposition with the influential Bavarian Christian Social Union pushing for the exclusion of Turkey from the European Union part of their party platform. For Cem Oezdemir, the interpretation of the European Union as Christian-European, "reflects traces of racism according to the mottothe Turk as an old Barbarian is not suited for democracy and civil rights."¹⁶ This resentment is by no means restricted to the older generations. Thus Stefan Gaitanides refers to 61 percent of the youth interviewed in the representative annual Shell study as reporting that the number of foreigners is too high. Other indicators cited for the general German resentment of foreigners in their country are the rejection of higher immigration rates, the refusal of the dual citizenship system noted earlier, and the hostile reaction to the principle of cultural pluralism by a large proportion of the population.¹⁷

Another widely shared belief by conservatives before it was slowly dropped is the notion of a *Leitkultur* (defining or guiding culture). This *Leitkultur*, covering knowledge of the principal components of German culture, ranging from Mozart to Schiller though not necessarily Marx, was supposed to guide the integration of migrant workers. The concept conveys the notion of a society with cultural homogeneity in contrast to the idea of a multi-cultural society with ethnic and/or religious configurations shaping components of an individual's identity. In a multi-cultural society various groups can co-exist with the integrating component provided not through culture but through adherence to universally valid principles, such as those embodied in a democratic social system. Whereas multi-culturalism allows for the further differentiation of one's culture, a German *Leitkultur* would have the goal of cultural assimilation. Multi-culturalism would accord equal status to or at least tolerate 'alien' religions and cultural formations compared to the dominant German culture. It goes without saying that such acceptance of Islam and Arab music is difficult for most Germans who are raised in the Christian occident tradition, the '*christliches Abendland*.'

Germany's view of foreigners is exacerbated by the traditional economic West-East divide, which unification failed to bridge. Whereas individuals living in West Germany had limited experience of post-war democracy, the East German population never experienced such a democratic political system. Overt racism and violent acts against foreigners were strictly controlled in the old socialist regime. Certainly, xenophobic tendencies can be observed in both parts of Germany, but hatred of and open acts of violence against foreigners are much more common in East Germany than in West Germany; which is somewhat ironic because few foreigners actually live in East Germany. These conditions are also fueled by a peculiar historically rooted German phenomenon: self-hatred and hatred of Germany as a nation. As Thomas Schmid pointed out "The hatred of foreigners stalking Germany today has also to do with the traditional German hatred of themselves and of each other. Because the Germans have not yet come to terms with themselves [as Germans] they cannot come to terms with foreigners."¹⁸ The constrained integration of German speaking Dukedoms and Principalities under Prussia, guided by the 'iron chancellor' Bismarck in 1871 did not generate a strong sense of nationhood. Whatever nation-building was able to achieve, sentiments in the fifteen years of the Weimar Republic was tainted by the atrocities of the Third Reich and World War II.

The ongoing East-West German schism aggravates the problem. Germans residing in the old states, the *Wessies* (West Germans) have a hard time accepting those from the new States, the *Ossies* (East Germans). If both

groups have the commonly observed 'wall in their heads' [*Mauer im Kopf*], a sentiment running in both directions, how can it be expected that Germans would move beyond the mere toleration of 'foreigners' speaking German with an accent and limited comprehension of German culture?. Integration assumes that a society is open and characterized by tolerance of divergent life styles. In short, that there is a collective conscious and acceptance of multi-culturalism. Unfortunately, this is not case in present day Germany.

Immigration as an Economic Necessity

As distinct from the high birth rate in the Turkish communities where two thirds of the members are less than 40 years old and the nuclear family structure is fairly stable, German families appear to be fragmented with birthrates far below the replacement rate. The average German-Turkish family has more than three children, its native German counterpart barely one. At the current birthrate of about one child per family, Germany's current population of 82 million will fall to less than 60 million by the year 2050. In addition, the drastic aging of the German population will have dire consequences for the social security system. To use the words of the Governor of Saarland, Peter Mueller, "Germany is steering into a demographic catastrophe." The workforce is estimated to shrink from 41 to 26 million, a development which will lead to the collapse of the pension system unless steps are taken to replenish the labor force.¹⁹ Put differently, for advanced industrial societies with a high level of medical care, a reproduction rate of 2.1 live birth per female is necessary. In Germany that rate has declined to 1.3 and mirrors the tendency in most European countries.²⁰ Globalization could solve the problem if the relatively free flow of money and information were accompanied by a free movement of labor and if transnational migration were facilitated by the rise of trade zones and the suspension of national borders. However, these conditions have not transpired. Globalization appears to generate restrictions on the movement of labor.

Fostering immigration will have to be an essential part of German labor policies. Some steps have been taken in this direction by the coalition government of environmentalist and social democrats. Thus Germany's green card system permits selective immigration for highly skilled labor from the information and communication technology sectors. In spite of unemployment rates running close to ten percent, Germany has more than 1.7 million open positions which cannot be filled, including a shortage of knowledge workers estimated to be as high as 440,000 (21). Though backed by the trade unions, industry federations, and other major German lobbies, enabling green card

legislation by the government was fiercely opposed by the opposition CDU/CSU parties, though the legislation passed in August 2000.

Given the restrictions attached to the card, by April 2001 only 6,200 green cards had been issued, which was far below the goal of 20,000 permits the quota permitted.²¹ The constraints of the card included limitation of the work period to five years, the exclusion of spouses, and the required possession of a university diploma. If the applicant lacked a University diploma he must prove that his past income amounted to at least \$50,000, a rather steep figure for individuals from the Third World. Though Germany is the European country most in need for knowledge workers, she is not a favorite work destination for skilled professionals. Germany remains a country of last choice or a transit station on the way to the United States, Canada, and France, Scandinavia, the United Kingdom or other countries that are more adept in competing for the scarce resource of knowledge professionals. Furthermore, foreign knowledge workers residing temporarily in Germany are not the only ones to leave. According to estimates by the Federal Department of Research, about twenty percent of recent native German university graduates with doctoral degrees are leaving Germany mostly for the United States, and frequently without the intention of returning.²²

A law based on the green card experiment which opens up Germany to more skilled workers and makes residence easier to obtain for foreign students and self-employed migrants, was passed by the lower house but was overturned by the court in response to suits filed by opposition parties. What is striking is the political failure by German conservative parties and most of the population to realize that economic growth for most advanced industrial societies is tied to a successful immigration policy. The United States which has been receiving one million legal and illegal immigrants per year (though immigrant labor is also a hotly debated topic) has been having a higher economic growth over the last ten years than advanced industrial European countries, and is certainly more successful in attracting and retaining knowledge workers than Germany. Nonetheless, Stephen Baker estimates that there will be labor shortages in the United States by the year 2010, and suggests that Germany must increase the number of immigrants twenty fold²³ in order to avoid an implosion into a geriatric society and offset low birthrates. It seems that without sharply increasing immigration Germany will continue having a permanent recession.

Given the popular ignorance of these facts and the reluctance of politicians to speak up it comes as no surprise that most surveys report the majority of Germans believe that Germany has too many foreigners. Certainly, there is a high concentration of foreigners in German metropolitan areas which may prompt this view. For those who have applied for asylum, processing

takes about one year during which the applicant cannot work and must stay in the town to which he is assigned, thus reinforcing the stereotype of the lazy alien taking advantage of the German welfare state. It is estimated that in addition to the 3.4 million non-German nationals, there are about one million undocumented aliens—hence, illegal migrants living primarily in major metropolitan German centers (compared to an estimated 3 - 6 million illegal immigrants in the USA).

The visible presence of foreigners, Germany's economic problems, and the failure of the political system to communicate to the public the important economic need for foreign labor have contributed to distrust and resentment of migrant groups, which are reinforced by the recent events of terrorism carried out by Muslims. It is a truism that trust and positive sentiments toward aliens are difficult to build in an atmosphere of fear and anxiety. German observers and officials were critical of U.S. politicians and government officials maintaining the sense of crisis and impending disaster through constant warnings of imminent terrorist acts, the preventive imprisonment of hundreds of Muslims, and the curtailment of civil liberties. German officials downplayed the terrorist threat and were skeptical of U.S. claims. Yet since the murder of numerous German tourists and the abduction of others by alleged terrorists in Tunisia and Indonesia, German officials now propagate Germany as a likely target of terrorist threats. Against the background of a deteriorating economy, such threats indirectly foster fear of radical Muslims among the German population and the general perception that foreigners are potentially a menace.

Specifically, among those coming from the elusive yet powerfully entrenched background of a *Christliches Abendland* there is a fear and latent distrust of foreigners. This 'Christian Occident' is for most Germans synonymous with Western culture. Friedrich Merz, the former whip of the Christian Democratic Union, suggested that immigrants assimilate to the German '*Leitkultur*,' or guiding culture. The wide discussion of this *Leitkultur* emphasizing the difference between migrant workers and Germans struck a chord and added to latent dislike of the 'aliens'. Though there have been numerous federal initiatives enacted since September 11, 2000 to minimize radicalization of Muslim communities and foster cooperation between ethnic groups, it remains to be seen if these initiatives will be effective. Similar to the popular press in the United States, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center were presented in the German media as an attack on Western civilization. As numerous incidents indicate, relations between the Turkish and German communities have deteriorated ever since.²⁴

Violence against foreigners has frequently erupted in Eastern Germany. Such strategies are fed by resentments about unemployment, which runs at twice the West German rate, and wages that are lower than those in West Germany. Ironically, similarly to Turks in Germany, East Germans have a sense of being politically or economically second-rate citizens since they had little control over the political order imposed on them and tend to lack the economic clout of West Germans. What happened in Germany can be observed in most of Europe. A right wing drift and rise of xenophobia can be found in most European countries since the golden age of European prosperity came to a dead halt in the late eighties. This vast social drift was fueled by the prospect of massive immigration from East European countries after the break down of communism in 1989 and its implicit threat to what remains socially and economically in Europe. Such perceived apprehension is tied to the Eastward expansion of the European Union and the fear of cheap labor flooding into Western Europe.²⁵

Most Turks living in Germany are gainfully employed. Those without work are better off than living unemployed in Turkey, and have an optimistic view of the future. Nonetheless, up to 75 percent feel they are treated like second-class citizens and consider the equal treatment of all foreigners as their principal political goal.²⁶ Also adding to the sense of alienation among migrant Turkish labor is that virtually all other foreign born groups have better legal status. Among the groups enjoying a better legal and socio-economic standing, are political refugees, individuals displaced by violent conflicts, those seeking asylum, millions of individuals from East European countries with German origin due to a distant ancestor (based on the *ius sanguinis*), and about 1.8 million individuals with passports from European Union member states. There is the stark contrast between the third generation Turk who speaks fluent German but could not become a German citizen until fairly recently, and the third generation German from Russia without any knowledge of German who was able to receive instant citizenship and access to all services of the German welfare state until German authorities imposed a language requirement in the mid nineties. Whereas Germans spent about \$ 1.5 billion in 1997 to ensure integration of the 3 million ethnic Germans, funding for the integration of German-Turks fell far below the billions spent on ethnic Germans. The same holds for German language training. In 2000, about \$150 million were used for that purpose, primarily for ethnic Germans and Jewish immigrants with virtually no significant amount spent on Turks. Yet, according to the federal secretary for foreigners, meeting the language needs of that group alone will require close to \$600 million a year.

Educational Barriers

Compared to German youth, many young Turks in Germany are more likely to grow up marginalized in an economically deprived environment with restricted educational opportunities and a limited command of the German language. Turks in Germany, more than any other ethnic group, have been hit by the pervasive German recession and experienced declines in their living standards. For the young German Turk, including those from families who have been in Germany for three generations, the most important issue is unemployment; they have a hard time competing with young Germans. Above and beyond the discrimination to which they are exposed, there is the accumulation of educational deprivations impacting their fate. Specifically, linguistic deficiencies have been identified as a major factor reinforced by a German school system and regulations that do not adapt to the needs of Turkish children. Though the Turks are the single largest minority group in Germany, and constitute the majority of the population in many school districts, there are currently few German teachers who are proficient in the Turkish language. There are no large scale initiatives to establish a bilingual educational system or language programs for German-Turkish students and their parents.

In many Turkish communities in Germany, German is not often spoken. A Turk who is a legal resident in Germany, even if naturalized, and ‘fetches’ a bride from Turkey, will see his spouse moored at home for one year before she can apply for a work permit. This means she will spend most of her time at home, watching Turkish television programs transmitted via satellite; she will virtually have no exposure to Germans and their language. Given the recession in Germany, such a process is likely to continue for a couple of years when she has children. The children in turn will spend their formative years consuming Turkish television programs. To a large extent it is vicious cycle.

Young Turks whose parents are un- or underemployed do not have sufficient opportunities to engage in upward mobility and enjoy the good “western” life, as defined by more consumption and more leisure time. Rather, lacking economic independence, they are forced into a dependency relation with their families and the larger Turkish community that serves as their support system. It is little wonder than that in the recent study “Life Worlds: German Turks 2002” the family was ranked highest in the values held by Turks, followed by the desire for true friendship, and a satisfying occupation. As distinct from Germans the value of “an exciting life” did not score high among German-Turks.²⁷ The long taken for granted German mantra of *Kinder, Kueche, Kirche* (children, kitchen, church) and its consequences no longer

holds for most young Germans, and is more suitable to apply to the Turkish community in Germany.

More than 75 percent of the students in basic primary schools in major metropolitan areas, such as Berlin and the Ruhr Valley metropolitan belt where Turkish communities tend to concentrate, are of Turkish origin. Most of the first-graders do not master the German language since they grew up in settings where Turkish was mostly spoken. In Kreuzberg, a district in Berlin, 63 percent of all children born to foreign parents do not speak a single word of German when they enter the first year of school. Also, four out of five Turkish first-graders have no knowledge of German, which severely hampers their ability learn in German schools.²⁸ Eighty percent of their parents cannot participate in parent teacher conferences since their command of German is too limited. This linguistic deficit is rarely overcome in the school setting and is therefore a significant barrier for students to acquire knowledge in other subject areas. Though the powerful narrowing of life chances through restricted language command is obvious, and had been demonstrated by Basil Bernstein and other socio-linguists long ago, the German educational establishment did not focus on the language problem of the Turkish community until after the publication of the infamous PISA study.

Close to fifty percent of all foreign students attend schools which do not allow them, after graduation, to continue training in advanced schools. Only 20 percent of German students graduate from those schools. Further, the drop out rate among Turkish students is much higher than among German students. Even Turkish students who graduate find it difficult to enter the trade apprenticeship system practiced in Germany, which combines onsite skills training for three years with mandatory education in a vocational school. Thus, 40 percent of all Turkish school graduates do not succeed in getting occupational training compared to eight percent of German students.

The linguistic divide shapes the scholastic progress. In the basic primary schools, about 12 percent of all students are of foreign origin. By the time students reach the academic high school, the *Gymnasium*, the percentage has melted to about four. Moreover, there is a severe under-representation of Turkish students in the university system for which an *Abitur*, or academic high school certificate, is mandatory.²⁹ In the recessive economy of contemporary Germany with its ample supply of labor, the *Abitur* has become a prerequisite for apprenticeships in white collar occupations. But of the small percentage of Turks with the academic high school certificate not one had secured, in 2003, an entry level position with the largest German bank, the Deutsche Bank.³⁰

What contributes to these conditions is the German educational system. Children start schooling at the age of six or seven while in most other European countries children start schooling at least one year earlier. Children from migrant families in Germany tend to start later since they are retained in earlier grades for academic reasons. In these circumstances, social factors seem to be compounded by ethnic factors. Recent research on children in some Berlin school districts revealed that two-thirds of the children from disadvantaged families require supplementary language training since their German was deficient. However, whereas one-half of disadvantaged German children required more training, an amazing 90 percent of children from migrant families need such help.³¹

It is little wonder that Germany falls well below the average of advanced industrial societies in comparative educational studies such as PISA.³² To quote the Spiegel magazine, "The proportion of extremely weak students is especially high as is the disparity between extremely high and extremely low achievers. As noted, in no other country is there such a strong correlation between social origin and scholastic achievement. Whereas 50 percent of the children from the upper-middle-class attend the academic high school [*Gymnasium*] only ten percent comes from the working class."³³ Needless to add, the structural underachievement of minority students played a significant part in Germany scoring so poorly.

In light of the above, the 2001 report by the Independent Commission on Migration headed by Rita Suessmuth, suggested the need for urgent reform in the education and training policy areas. To improve the educational and linguistic standing of migrant populations and to facilitate their integration, specific measures were proposed including mandatory language training in German with costs to be borne in part by immigrant, participation in the education and vocational training system for the young, more immediate access to the labor market for those likely to gain permanent residency, greater engagement of the public service in the training of immigrants, and assistance programs for self-employment among foreigners.³⁴

A Parallel Society

It is suggestive but not accurate to use the term ghettoization for the Turkish communities in Germany. To begin with, there is no forced residential segregation of the Turkish population, and their communities have a transparency and dynamism absent from ghetto settings. They permit exchange and interactions with the larger society in which they are embedded. Apart

from the work setting, there are cultural and social isolation, vis a vis German society, but such isolation can also be observed among German blue-collar workers or the German underclass. What is more significant is the withdrawal into traditional cultural and, sometimes, religious values. Thus, there is a 'Back to the Turkish Roots' phenomenon as exhibited by the increasing number of young Turks from Germany who get their spouses from Turkey and the low rate of marriages between a Turkish and a German, hovering around five percent.

If inter-marriage is taken as an indicator for 'integration', Turks in Germany are probably the least integrated group. The micro census of 1995 revealed that 98 percent of married Turkish women and 95 percent of all married Turkish men had partners from the same nationality. Equally significant is the divorce phenomenon involving mixed marriages between a German and a foreign spouse. Data from the 1991-1995 period show that couples involving a Turkish and a German partner have the highest divorce rates compared to couples with a Yugoslav, Greek, Italian, Greek or Spanish partner. Thus, 63.8% of all German women married to a Turkish man will seek a divorce, and 31.2% of all German men are married to a Turkish woman. Divergent life styles as reflected in cultural and religious differences apparently doom many of these marriages to failure.³⁵

These findings conform to data about inter-generational socialization. There is an amazing high synchronization of intergenerational values, with young Turks reporting that their values and normative orientations are identical to those of their parents. Martina Sauer reports from a representative survey that only four percent of young Turks aged 18-29 enumerate values conflicting with their parents' orientation. More than ninety percent of those identified as having traditional values come from families sharing these values.³⁶

The return to the roots, or what has been aptly called "Euro Turkism" is a functional adaptation to socio-economic and cultural factors that lead to marginalization and discrimination by and from the German society. This process is reinforced by linguistic factors that limit social interaction or integration between Turks and Germans, especially in leisure activities.³⁷ Numerous studies report that primary interaction takes place within the context of the extended family, followed by contacts in the neighborhood. Being meshed into Turkish culture communities, with very few identifying themselves as 'German' and most expressing religious affiliation, many Turks live in a context that structurally inhibits social interaction outside the community.³⁸

High unemployment rates contribute to isolation from the German community and withdrawal to the Turkish community. Thus, unemployment among Turkish adults is about 22 percent. In 2001, 40 percent of Turkish

males residing in Berlin were unemployed, most of them under the age of forty.³⁹ Of the 35 000 unemployed in Cologne in late 2001, 20 000 were foreigners and, in turn, 90 percent of these foreigners were Muslims with German-Turks in the overwhelming majority.⁴⁰

Reinforcing this rift between the German demand for fairly complete integration and the Turkish response of a parallel society are the structural processes post-industrial societies are currently experiencing, such as de-industrialization, the rise of the service sector, and the shift towards a knowledge and information based economy requiring sharper cognitive skills. These structural processes victimize those who are least prepared, young Germans from the underclass and members from Turkish communities without an education or trade certificate. It should be no surprise that those affected rely on their communities, which are well established in fairly stable ethnic neighborhoods. Even if employment is secured it would be difficult to move or 'escape' given the housing discrimination against Turks.

It is noteworthy that the gradual process of Islamization did not commence until the eighties both in Germany and Turkey. In Turkey, failure of the political parties to offer meaningful alternatives and motivating symbols opened the door for the Islamic party which provided both political programs and an account of the Turkish malaise. In Germany, after family unification was completed, some of the third generation German-Turks turned to Islam as a satisfying system of meaning. Islam proved plausible and met their psychological and social needs, the needs of marginalized groups excluded from meaningful political and social participation in the larger German society.

In Turkey, the rise of religious political sentiments, or moderate fundamentalism, as reflected in the stunning election victory by the Justice and Development Party in the Fall of 2002, poses a threat to the secular foundations of the Turkish state. The party leader Recep Erdogan, for example, embraces the rule of the *Sharia*, religious law, and makes no secret out of his disdain for democracy. This is bound to shape television broadcasts from Turkey to become more conservative. For many Turkish migrants, information about Germany are derived from Turkish rather than German media which are very critical about Germany, the decision by the European Union to postpone consideration of Turkey's application for membership is a case in point. The Turkish language press in Germany is actually more nationalistic than their counterparts in Turkey. The Turkish language news paper Huerriyet is the most popular daily followed by Bild (German equivalent to the Post), and claims to be read by 80 percent of the German-Turkish community. The German RTL and Pro Sieben television channels which are primarily entertainment-oriented are the most popular in the German-Turkish community, with the Turkish state broadcast TRT-INT garnering third-place

having 34 percent of the German-Turkish audience.⁴¹ The content of Turkish print and electronic media can contribute to the isolation of the Turkish community from larger German society unless alternative sources of information are used.

This view is not universally held in Germany. Hans Juergen Weiss argues, for example, that about half of the Turkish community, the younger and better educated ones, are “well integrated,” whereas the remainder have “the potential for integration” or are “poorly integrated”. He suggests that the majority of the German-Turkish population do not live in ghettos. Though a large proportion of German-Turks surround themselves with Turkish culture, it is the sense of a “second living room which one leaves again.”⁴² Evidently, this suggestion does not take into account that most Turks have only one living room and cannot dispense with their identity like changing their wardrobe. Further, a growing similarity in consumption patterns between the more affluent Turks and their German counterparts reflects one of many factors signaling an emerging integration. The pragmatic act of purchasing a garment, even if it is status enhancing, can hardly be equated with the normative act of participating in a family ritual, being exogamous, or acquiring a job in an open labor market.

Yet there are no indicators that the current generation of German-Turks is becoming radicalized and that the gradual establishment of a parallel society is in and by itself dysfunctional. The “significant potential “for adopting an Islamic-fundamentalist belief system is frequently misread as an actual indicator of fundamentalism. If indeed, as Heitmeyer suggests, half of the Turkish youth consider their religion to be superior and prefer traditional values, it is mere speculation that they would act on these values.⁴³ (Moreover, one needs to take stock of what values characterize various religions. It may be that there is considerable overlap in such values, e.g., family-oriented, strong work ethic, values of honesty and responsibility.) *Pari passu*, most practicing Protestants, Catholic, or Jews consider their religion to be superior to, a simple function of maintaining cognitive balance. Of the German-Turks who have decided to join a mosque community, only 8 percent opted for a fundamentalist branch whereas seventy two percent were more at home with a moderate orientation.⁴⁴ This low-level of religious radicalism is also reflected in data provided by the German Department of Justice which estimated in 1999 that about 40.000 German-Turks are members of extremist Turkish groups, a miniscule percentage. It is noteworthy that the discourse of these ‘radicals’ was primarily shaped by political events in Turkey and not by events in Germany.⁴⁵

Though Germany has not recently experienced race or ethnic conflicts on a societal level, the rise of ethnic conservatives and some academics view the rise of ethnic consciousness in the Turkish community with severe

misgivings. This reflects the fear of a parallel society, According to Tilman Meyer, a Professor at the University of Bonn; ethnic fragmentation is a regression of the political culture, and would result in the formation of ethnic colonies causes conflicts and underclass juvenile delinquency. As he phrases it, "A cultural re-orientation into the Islamic sphere can lead to militant tendencies of Islamisation, strengthen[s] the formation of urban colonies and constitute a conflict potential which we know from the past..." an ominous threat indeed.⁴⁶

Rather than viewing an enhanced ethnic consciousness as a political regression, the rise of a parallel Turkish society in Germany can be conceptualized as a logical response to two social processes of post-industrial society: privatization and the quest for a sense of identity. These processes can also be observed for other segments of German society, though paradoxically it is easier for young Turks to satisfy the desire for identity in a Turkish neighborhood surrounded by a large German city than would be the case for a young German. The latter tends to be barely linked to such communities since the bonds have become frail. In many cases, the individual is no longer linked to an extended or even nuclear family. The Christian faith may not be an option because it fails to offer the broad individuation that Islam allows. "The Islam does not separate the sacred and the profane; the religion thus plays a central role in the everyday life of the individual. The faith has therefore a decisive impact on the identity and life of the Turkish Muslim," as Andreas Goldberg notes.⁴⁷

Research by Rolf-Peter Loehr of socially problematic quarters in 200 urban areas did not provide strong evidence for a process of ghettoization, however "tendencies for the formation of parallel societies are unmistakable among Turks."⁴⁸ This is reinforced by their concentration in urban areas. Apart from class-specific patterns of residential segregation, customary for most societies, we now observe in Germany ethnic residential segregation, a fairly new phenomenon. Thus regional studies showed for 2001 that about 20 percent of all Turks live in predominantly Turkish neighborhoods, five percent in city sections where foreigners prevail, fourteen in mixed neighborhoods and the remainder in predominantly German sections.⁴⁹ But even if physical proximity is missing, the new electronic media permit Muslim cyber communities and communicative interaction with other Turks. The most prominent website, muslimmarkt.de, provides informational services and has about 100 000 hits each month, with a noticeable increase after September 11.⁵⁰

Compared to the other approximately 100 different nationalities living in German urban areas, the Turks have the critical population mass necessary to develop a parallel society and have been in Germany long enough to do so.

This is clearly evidenced in the rise of an institutionalized social infrastructure in the Turkish community, permitting an individual born into a Turkish family to live in Turkish communities until death without ever speaking a word of German. These institutions range from soccer clubs, to service industries, such as the restaurant business, from locally produced media to satellite transmitted television and print media from Turkey, from religious institutions to computer and internet clubs. By the year 2001 there were more than 2,200 mosques in Germany organized by religious associations, incorporating many schools teaching the Koran with a tendency toward “fundamentalist indoctrination” among the Mullahs trained in Turkey. As noted by Loehr these schools have a particular appeal for young Turks searching for identity and support.

Integration of the Turks into German society as a political goal of the 1980s has been a failure, specifically if it is posited as ‘cultural assimilation’ under the German *Leitkultur* and understood as social integration into the larger society. According to recent research on cultural consumption patterns, most members of Turkish communities consider themselves Turks, and only 3 percent perceive themselves as fully German. By and large the command of the German language is inferior to the command of Turkish. The preference for Turkish books and music is much higher than for German cultural products. It is noteworthy that this preference persists among second generation German-Turks that have a better grasp of the German language.⁵¹

From a more modest perspective, economic absorption into the labor force of most Turkish migrant workers has been attained. However, this “economic integration” does not apply to a fairly large proportion of the Turkish minority in Germany, which has become a dependent, underclass population. This underclass survives through public welfare and the resources of their communities and is a constant irritant to many native Germans. Unemployment is twice as high among foreign workers than among Germans, and highest among Turkish workers. During the recession of 2001/2002 in Germany one-third of employed Turkish workers lost their jobs. The social distance between Turkish migrants and the German population has become larger with the exception of the relatively small group of upper-middle-class Turkish migrants, and a small cadre of technical and cultural intelligentsia, which by virtue of their class position has closer contact with their German counterparts. According to some observers, the upscale German-Turkish groups feel more at home with their German counterparts than with poor and marginalized members of the Turkish community. So there is an emerging class-based rift within the Turkish community.

The process of “distantiation” of the Turks from the German society has been subsumed in Germany under the term “*Re-Ethnisierung*”, the return to the ethnic roots and the development of a corresponding cultural and,

sometimes, religious framework. As Rita Suessmut, the chief of the governmental commission on immigration phrased it, "We have been living for years with many Turks in Germany, our knowledge of the Muslim culture and religion is so minimal that we hardly know each other. According to our legal order *we are not a country of immigrants*, thus have not systematically pursued the task of integration. Rather we have given the message to the migrants that they should have gone home long ago." [Italics added.]⁵² The reality has been that most migrants decided to make their Turkish home in Germany and develop a network of institutions shaping the Turkish community.

Changes: Anti-Discrimination Steps

Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam stipulates that all members of the European Union must pass anti-discrimination legislation by July 2003, though in 1996 Germany signed the UN agreement calling for the elimination of racism. In June and November of 2000, the European Council promulgated guidelines to create a uniform basis for anti-discrimination measures. These measures set the framework for national anti-discrimination legislation by members of the European Union. The June Guideline, number 43, sets forth actions necessary to combat discrimination on the basis of race or ethnic origin in the employment, educational, and social sectors, including access to publicly provided goods and services, such as apartment rental sector. For cases where discrimination can be reasonably ascertained, the guideline suggests a shift of burden of evidence from plaintiff to the accused party.

Among other actions proposed by the guideline are a "social" dialogue between employer and employee to generate measures reducing discrimination, a discourse with non-governmental organizations concerned with discrimination, and the establishment by each member state of appropriate governmental agencies or offices charged with ensuring the equal non-discriminatory treatment of all people.⁵³ Guideline number 78 addresses more specifically the framework for ensuring equal treatment in employment. In addition to race and ethnicity, religion, disability, age and sexual orientation are enumerated as possible factors prompting discrimination and require appropriate actions. Further, the guidelines specify that they apply to the public and private sectors, including the government and cover access to education and employment, as well as conditions of work and employment.

Among the measures the guidelines direct member states to create conditions facilitating the employment of handicapped workers, to provide adequate legal recourse for those who have been discriminated against, and to remove administrative and legal provisions which run counter the guidelines

promulgated by the European Community. They reaffirm in section 10 that the burden of proof is shifted to the accused party. Put differently, those accused of discrimination must show that the refusal to provide services and goods was legitimate and not prompted by illegal motives. December 2003 is set as the deadline by which member states must have implemented through laws and administrative procedures the guidelines covering anti-discrimination.

However, an extension of three years can be granted commencing December 2003, though those granted such delay must provide an annual report describing the steps the government has taken to reduce discrimination.⁵⁴ The country not carrying out the stipulation is subject to being fined. Guidelines developed by the European Community specify that member states must establish by July 2003. Organizations and offices that have the task of fostering and monitoring equal treatment of citizens need to start the relevant research and their monitoring activities.

These guidelines pose particular challenges to Germany since their anti-discrimination policies have been delayed by ten to twenty years. Further, “not only is the legal basis [for such policies] lacking in [German] civil law but the politically well anchored conception and praxis of legally bestowing inequality [by according the official status of a foreigner] is one of the causes for a rather limited moral consciousness with respect to unjustified discriminations on the basis of race, ethnicity, religious, or political beliefs.”⁵⁵ The guidelines stipulate that the creation of a “societal consciousness” for ending discrimination requires making the public at large more sensitive towards the issues involved, working closely with nongovernmental organizations in that area, enlightening the potential victims of discrimination, and educating policy and decision makers from the private and public sectors.”⁵⁶ As noted, the administrative structures necessary for this massive anti-discrimination educational effort do not exist, and may be established gradually, if at all, given the current economic plight in Germany.

In spite of the liberalization of the citizenship laws most descendants of immigrant laborers have remained resident outsiders whether from the first, second or third generation. Most of the Turkish minority in Germany has no civil rights, e.g., voting or adequate political representation. Though they constituted about three percent of the population only three of the more than 600 members of the German parliament were of Turkish origin in 2002. Turks in Germany experience systematic discrimination in the employment, service, and housing market, as numerous studies carried out by the Center for Turkish Studies have pointed out. In most of the conflicts between Muslims, thus Turks and Germans, Turks and not Germans experience discrimination and rejection. Put more bluntly, in Germany it is against the law to publicly deride a foreign ethnic or national group, but there is little or no legal recourse if

members of this group are refused access to employment, housing, and services, whereas the opposite holds for the United States. (Though, by no stretch of the imagination is the United States a perfect role model in terms of race and ethnic relations.) In the United States, one can openly articulate one's hatred of foreigners and disdain for ethnic groups but is punished for translating these views into action, up to including bias crimes

As Carolyne Frederickson points out, "German courts have declined to protect women and minorities from job discrimination by invoking the 'freedom of contract' doctrine holding that people should be free to choose their contracting partners and determine the content of an agreement."⁵⁷ Though the German Basic Law appears to protect against discrimination, it does not give full protection to foreigners. Article 1, Paragraph one stipulates that, "The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority." In Article 3, paragraph 3 it states that, "No one shall be prejudiced or favored because of his sex, his parentage, his race, his language, his homeland, and origin, his faith or his religious or political opinions" In her analysis of these provisions Miriam J. Aukerman argues that:

they [the articles] are limited in several crucial respects. First, neither article has been interpreted to apply to interactions between individuals and third parties, and both are typically limited to interactions between the individual and the state. Second, Article 3.3 has been interpreted to prohibit intentional discrimination by the state, but de facto or indirect discrimination - as when state regulations unintentionally compromise religious observances. Third, while Article 3.3 forbids discrimination against foreigners because of their sex, parentage, race, language homeland, or origin, faith or religious or political opinions, it does not prohibit discrimination against foreigners because they are not German citizens. Since most of those discriminated against do not have German citizenship, it can be difficult to prove that discrimination occurred on account of the individual's ethnicity, or race as opposed to his or her foreign status.⁵⁸

It is noteworthy that anti-discrimination and or related legislation have been passed in numerous countries like France, Holland, Great Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Canada, and the United States, countries which also have much better track records attracting and retaining skilled migrants. Some of these countries were forced to adapt to the transformation of their societies into multi-ethnic entities when the loss of colonies resulted in an influx of former alien 'citizens' after World War II. In others like Canada, the United States, and in a more limited sense Switzerland, there was acceptance of the notion of being immigration countries. For the Scandinavian countries, long democratic traditions paved the way for anti-discrimination legislation. In Sweden for example the first discrimination laws were passed in

1986 and included the challenge to employers and workers to foster ethnic diversity and are now refined to the point that discrimination of individuals wearing a turban is outlawed.

Germany lacked the democratic tradition and the understanding of being a country of immigrants though she had a long history of employing foreign labor. Nor did she have to face the demographic consequences of colonialism. Thus, German restaurant owners can still refuse service to 'foreigners' without impunity, whereas a Dutch restaurateur would see his establishment closed down by the authorities for such an act. Since Germany has no effective anti-discrimination legislation it would be unrealistic to expect that Germany will adopt affirmative action legislation in the near future given popular opposition to such measures and the emergence of an influential political right wing. But one could expect that Germany would void current laws that institutionalize discrimination and prevent discriminatory regulations from being enacted by the European Community. For example in the area of employment preferential treatment is provided to nationals from member nations of the European Union. With the enlargement of the European Union, many under- or semi-skilled German-Turks who decide not to be naturalized, would rank second compared to workers from Poland and other East European countries. German-Turks would not be able to search for employment in other European Union countries. Unless there is a radical change in German laws governing citizenship, the Eastward expansion of the European Union will result in a dramatic increase of unemployment among German-Turks and an increase in the size of the German-Turkish underclass.

Current German legislation lawfully discriminates in several areas against foreigners though they may have been living in Germany for a long time. There are regulations which apply to foreigners: the reduction of claims to social services when no such reductions are applied to Germans or holders of the European Union passport, the possibility of being deported since a claim for social welfare was filed, and the limited access to higher education.⁵⁹ Thus, a third generation of young Germans of Turkish descent who decide to opt for a Turkish citizenship while residing in Germany can, technically speaking, be deported when they apply for welfare.

Passage of anti-discrimination legislation would be a clear signal for migrants living in Germany that the German political elites, if not the German population, supported their protection under the law. It would also signal their assured equal access to education and labor, open housing and service markets. It would also have gone a long way to create confidence, if not trust, among members of the German-Turkish community. As designed by the governing red-green coalition, the law to prevent discrimination in civil proceedings [*Gesetz zu Verhinderung von Diskriminierungen im Zivilrecht*] was meant to

implement the guidelines from the European Union discussed earlier; to halt discrimination on the basis of handicaps, ethnic origin, race, sex, and religion in the areas of housing, services, etc., and shifts the burden of proof from plaintiff to defendant. Yet, shortly before submitting the law to parliament towards the end of the 2001/2002 legislative period, the governing parties withdrew their proposal, though its passing was part of the coalition agreement between the governing green and social democratic parties of 1998.

This decision was prompted by the proximity of federal elections and the possibility of the legislation not passing in the upper house since the conservative party and its allies were organized to block its passage. But the single biggest obstacle was the provision of the law precluding religious discrimination. There was support for the provision by the Central Council of Jews in Germany, yet Catholic and Protestant churches objected. The new law could have prevented preferential treatment of members of their denominations in the provision of educational and other services. The conservative opposition construed the proposed legislation as, "...a policy of equalization of minorities placing them on an equal status [with the German majority], which de facto represents being placed into a better position [*Besserstellung*] than the population constituting the majority, and to introduce into economic life compulsory contracts."⁶⁰ . It is no surprise that the housing and property association (*Zentralverband Haus & Boden*) rejected the legislation since it could interfere with rental and sales. Federation of employers made their opposition to provisions of the law known that would force them to provide evidence of non-discrimination if laying off staff. But it is ironic that economic associations such as the *Deutsche Industrie- und Handelskammer* which otherwise deplored the shortage of highly skilled labor in Germany, were opposed to the introduction of anti-discrimination laws. The legislation would have removed some of the obstacles to attracting such labor to Germany. Even after the government tried to work out a compromise, Churches did not provide support for the legislation for fear of being sued if the groups they served did not include minorities. Further, the legal expert, Norbert Geis, of the Bavarian opposition party, the Christian Social Union suggested that the anti-discrimination legislation interfered with the constitutionally guaranteed principle of private property.⁶¹ Interest groups, property holders and employers rejoiced when the current government failed to introduce its anti-discrimination law during the last legislative period.

In Germany, the widespread failure to respect cultural differences and thus the right to be different makes the development of successful immigration policies, as required by economic needs, very difficult. Since anti-discrimination legislation has not been passed it is unlikely that affirmative action policies can be developed ensuring migrants equal access to educational

and occupational opportunities. If no action is taken, the socio-economic disparities between the native Germans and the German-Turks will continue to grow.

Germany is facing a period of economic stagnation and dwindling resources. In that context, the absence of effective migration policies and anti-discrimination legislation will result in large segments of the German-Turkish communities becoming part of a permanent underclass. The German governing elite is caught in the dilemma posed by the xenophobia of large segments of the German population, large 'Christian' parties, and the objective need for policies fostering economic integration precluding the marginalization of German-Turks. Framing the issues in terms of assimilation and acculturation or exclusion and segregation may be helpful, but mystifies the socio-economic and political context. Culture, religion, fundamentalism, the Koran, are readily invoked, deplored or re-conceptualized to avoid facing the emerging underclass claiming an ethnic identity of their own

If the German government were to apply the policies it recommends to the Islamic World to the Muslim minorities living in Germany, such an ethnic underclass would be no problem. Among these policies are the "priorities" of "economic development," "fair distribution of equal opportunities," "participation in the political process," "raising the standard of education," and "engaging in a serious dialogue". This remedy suggested by the German State Department to Islamic countries would be essential in resolving the dilemma of integrating Turkish communities.⁶² In conclusion, the best prescription are effective policies leading to an improvement of the educational and occupational standing of German Turks, thus to their economic integration

FOOTNOTES

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1) see Max Weber's opposition to German farm hands being displaced by Polish migrant labors prompted by his nationalistic fear of *Ueberfremdung*, the domination of German culture by the inferior Polish one. Inaugural Lecture at the University of Freiburg, 1895.

2) Philip Martin, 'Germany Reluctant Land of Immigration, in German Issues Vol. 21, 1998 p.7

3) A Spiegel report suggests, that in Berlin about half of all Turkish males look for a bride in Turkey.. March 4, 2002

4) Andreas Goldberg et al, Migrationsbericht des Zentrums fur Turkeistudien 2002, Lit Verlag Munster-Hamburg-Berlin-London, 2002, p.15

5) The Economist, 12/07/2002

6) Ibid

7) Wall Street Journal, 5/6/02, p 15

8) Der Spiegel; on line 2/24/2002

9) Welt am Sonntag, August 5, 2002

10) "Structuring Immigration / Fostering Integration," Summary p.13, Bundesministerium des Inneren, Berlin: 2001

11) Migrationsbericht, op. cit., p.78

12) The Economist, August 10, 2002, p22

13) Projekt Ruhr: Ethnisches Mosaik des Ruhrgebiets, ZFT (Zentrum fuer Tuerkeistudien), Essen: 2003, p.98

14) Migrationsbericht, op.cit. p.38

- 15) The Economist, August 10, 2002, p. 23
- 16) Ibid.
- 17) S. Gaitanides "Die Legende der Bildung von Parallelgesellschaften." See the website:
www.intiativgruppe.de/publikationen/fachartikel/stefan5
- 18) Thomas Schmid, "Civil Society and Xenophobia in Germany. Comments on a Country which is a Stranger to itself", undated mimeo from the early nineties.
- 19) Business Week, Sept. 17 2001, p.53
- 20) Dieter Oberndoerfer, "Immigration liegt im Eigeninteresse", Das Parlament, p.4.
- 21) Most of the green cards were obtained by Indian nationals followed by those coming from the former Soviet Union
- 22) Spiegel on line, March 05, 2001 citing data from the Bitkom labor market study
- 23) Die Zeit, "Geschlossene Gesellschaft", 13/2002
- 24) "The Coming Battle for Immigrants", Business Week August 26, 2002
- 25) See for example. Die Zeit, Dossier 41/2001, "Ihr seid an allem schuld" [you are responsible for everything.]
- 26) There is objective merit to the fear, since the subsidies provided by the European Union to severely underdeveloped or economically deprived areas in the new German states (East Germany) and West Germany will now be going soon to areas in the new member states which are worse off. This is of grave concern since most of the West German areas have a high concentration of unemployment, thus concentration of Turkish communities, specifically in North Rhine Westphalia .
- 27) Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, "Tuerken in Deutschland", February 2002

- 28) Der Spiegel on line, 2/24/2002
- 29) ib. March 4, 2002 “Die Rueckseite der Republik”
- 30) Jochen Boelsche, “Pfusched am Kind”, Der Spiegel, 20/2002.
- 31) Dr, Stefan Schneider, Deutsche Bank Research, June 12, 2003
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- 32) Bericht ueber die Lage der Auslaender in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Drucksache 14/9883, Berlin: 2002, p. 98 .referring to: Berlin, Senatsverwaltung fuer Schule Jugend und Sport (ed.): Vergleiche: Ergebnisse der Sprachstandserhebung Baerenstark, Berlin, 2002
- 33) Deutsches PISA-Konsortium (Hrsg.): PISA 2000 - Basiskompetenzen von Schuelerinnen und Schuelern im Internationalen Vergleich. Opladen: 2001.
- 34) Der Spiegel, 20/2002).
- 35) “Structuring Integration,” op.cit. p. 12/13
- 36) Nadja Milewski, “Partnerwahl von Zuwanderern” unpublished Master’s thesis, 2002 pps 41, 61,62, and personal communication June, 2003.
- 37) Martina Sauer Kulturell-religioese Einstellungen junger tuerkischer Migranten in Deutschland, ZTS, Essen: 1999
- 38) See Klaus Boegner, FU Study on Integration, 2002
- 39) See for example, Bernhard Nauck, “Verwandtschaft als Soziales Kapital: Netzwerkbeziehungen in Tuerkischen Migrantenfamilien”, in Verwandtschaft, Michael Wagner et al, Stuttgart:1998; Ulgur Olat, Soziale und Kulturelle Identitaet Tuerkischer Migranten der 2. Generation in Deutschland, Kavac-Verlag, Hamburg:1998; Martina Sauer Der Islam Etabliert sich in Deutschland, ZTS, Essen:2000; Alois Weidacher, et al. DJI Auslaendersurvey, Deutsches Jugendinstitut, Muenchen: 2000.
- 40) Das Parlament p. 7
- 41) Die Zeit, Dossier 41, 2001, op.cit.

- 42) Spiegel on line June 16, 2001
- 43) Spiegel on line June 16, 2001
- 44) see Verlockender Fundamentalismus: Tuerkische Jugendliche In Deutschland, Wilhelm Heitmeyer et.al, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt: 19976
- 45) Migrationsbericht, op.cit. p.87
- 46) Verfassungsschutz Bericht 1999, Bundesministerium des Innern, Berlin, p. 154
- 47) “Konfliktpotentiale in Migrationsgesellschaften”, presentation for the German Society of Demography, Wiesbaden: March 2003
- 48) Migrationsbericht, op.cit. p 74
- 49) Das Parlament, 27. April 2001
- 50) Projekt Ruhr, op.cit.
- 51) Sueddeutsche Zeitung , December 4, 2001, “Eine Welt, ganz fuer sich”
- 52) ZTS 2003 unpublished research
- 53) www.dradio.de/cgi-bin/neu-tacheles/119
- 54) Amtsblatt der Europaeischen Gemeinschaften, July 19, 2000, L 180 22-25, Richtlinie 43
- 55) Amtsblatt der Europaeischen Gemeinschaften, November 2, 2000, L 303 16-21, Richtlinie 78
- 56) Auslaenderbericht, op.cit. p. 131.
- 57) Ibid.
- 58) Germany in Transition, Gale A. Mattox et al. eds, Westview Press, 1999, p.167

- 59) Miriam J Ackerman “Discrimination in Germany: A Call for Minority Rights” p. 172, in Germany in Transition, op.cit.
- 60) Hakki Keskin, Stuttgarter Schlossgespraeche, August 4, 2002.
- 61) Jurgen Ganzel, www: deutsche-stimme.de04-02
- 62) Sueddeutsche Zeitung, April 9, 2002
- 63) Address by Ambassador Dr. Gunter Mulack, Commissioner for Dialogue with the Islamic World, German Foreign Office, “Relations with the Islamic World: Dialogue or Confrontation?”, p.2, New York, November 18, 2003

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